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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
ST ATE OF GEORGIA
HARMONY LAND COMPANY, LLC,
KENT HASSELL, FREDERICK
SUMMERS, CLIFTON SMITH, OLD
TOWN INVESTMENTS, LLC, and
NAT HARDWICK,
Plaintiffs,

v.
REYNOLDS CAPITAL GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.

)

)
)

Civil Action File
2014CV245455

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

r °FILED IN OFFICE
JUN 302014

-

(;

DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
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ORDER ON DEFENDANT REYNOLDS CAPITAL GROUP, LLC'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED COMPLAINT
On June 26, 2014, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on
Defendant Reynolds Capital Group, LLC's ("Reynolds") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint. Upon consideration of the argument of the parties, the briefs submitted on the
Motion, and the record of the case, this Court finds as follows:
In March 2002, Plaintiff Harmony Land Company, LLC ("HLC") leased 3 77 acres of
undeveloped land in Putnam County, Georgia, for a term of 99 years (the "Leasehold"). In April
2006, Southeast Landco, LLC ("SELCO") entered into the Lease-Sale Contract agreeing to
purchase HLC's remaining interest in the Leasehold in exchange for $4.5 million and six free
lifetime golf memberships. Under the Lease-Sale Contract, SELCO would either provide six
lifetime memberships in a new golf club built on the Leasehold if it was completed within three
(3) years of the assignment of the lease, or, if a golf club was not built on the Leasehold after the
initial three (3) years, SELCO would provide lifetime memberships to the Reynolds Plantation
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Golf Club (the "Club") on neighboring property. According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Reynolds'
affiliates owned the Club. The Lease-Sale Contract stated that the obligation to provide the
memberships was "a covenant running with the land and shall encumber the Leasehold Estate."
The Lease-Sale Contract also stated that "All memberships and upgrades issued hereunder shall
in all other respects be subject to the rules and regulations of the club as they may exist from
time to time." According to the Complaint, SELCO is now Reynolds.
Sometime before August 31, 2006, SELCO (or Reynolds) presumably assigned the
Lease-Sale Contract to Linger Longer Development Company ("LLDC"),
affiliated with SELCO.1

a company allegedly

On August 31, 2006, the closing date, HLC transferred all of its rights,

title, and interest in the Leasehold directly to LLDC, by executing an assignment and indemnity
agreement. By August of2009, a golf course had not been built on the Leasehold and HLC
received six memberships to the Club? In May 2011, a receiver was appointed to manage
LLDC's assets. In August 2012, the receiver sold the Club to a new owner, who terminated
HLC's memberships. The issue before the Court is whether Reynolds has a continuing
obligation under the Lease-Sale Contract to provide lifetime dues-free golf memberships at the
Club to members ofHLC.
A court should grant a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff "would not be entitled to relief
under any state of facts that could be proven in support of his claim." Northeast Georgia Cancer
Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 28,29 (2009). In ruling

Neither an assignment of the initial Lease-Sale Contract nor a separate lease-sale contract
between HLC and LLDC (if there are such documents) are a part of the pleadings, but ultimately
HLC assigned its Leasehold to LLDC not SELCO or Reynolds.
2 While Plaintiffs aver in their Complaint that they "enjoyed the benefits of dues-free, Lifetime
Golf Memberships at Reynolds Plantation" from August 2009 to August 2012, it does not state
who conferred these memberships to them.
1
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on such a motion, the Court must accept as true all of plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations,
and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. Baker v. Mclntosh County Sch. Dist., 264
Ga. App. 509, 509 (2003). The Court finds that a determination of the parties' rights and
obligations cannot be determined at this preliminary stage of the litigation on the face of the
pleadings alone, and Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss is therefore denied.
1. Reynolds argues that the promise to provide lifetime memberships to the Club was a

covenant running with the land.
Reynolds first argues that the Lease-Sale Contract expressly states that the obligation to
provide free memberships "shall be a covenant running with the land and shall encumber the
Leasehold Estate." However, HLC argues that the agreement to offer free golf memberships at a
club located on a separate parcel of land from the Leasehold is a collateral agreement that cannot
run with the leasehold because the covenant does not affect the "nature, quality, value, use,
occupation, or enjoyment" of the Leasehold.

See Ricketson v. Bankers First Sav. Bank, FSB,

233 Ga App 11, 13 (1998) (finding that right of first refusal to buy neighboring parcels was
personal contract and not a covenant running with the land). "If the covenant is of a collateral
nature to the land, and is incapable in law of attaching to the interest or estate granted, it is a
personal obligation, and will not bind or pass to assignees, even where they are expressly
named." Goldberg v. Varner, 72 Ga. App. 673,677 (1945). The Court agrees. The only
promise of lifetime golf memberships that could be a covenant running with the land would be
golf memberships in a golf club built on the Leasehold, not at the neighboring Club.
If the obligation to provide golf memberships at the neighboring Club does not run with
the land, the question then becomes whether this personal obligation was assigned to LLDC, the
entity which ultimately took possession of the Leasehold, or remained with Reynolds.

Whether
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the parties intended for Reynolds to be released of any obligation to provide lifetime Club
memberships when it transferred its interest in the Leasehold to LLDC is not before the Court on
this Motion to Dismiss.

2. Reynolds argues that the memberships could be terminated under the express
language of the Club's Rules and Regulations.
Reynolds next argues that the Lease-Sale Contract made clear in Paragraph 16(d) that the
"lifetime memberships" were subject to "the rules and regulations of the club as they may exist
from time to time." In support of its Motion, Reynolds attaches a copy of a document called
"The Club at Reynolds Plantation Rules and Regulations." These rules, in Paragraph 13(d), state
that the Club reserves the right "to terminate any and all memberships for any reason" and "to
sell or otherwise dispose of the Club Facilities in any manner whatsoever."
HLC argues that the Court may not consider this unsigned, unauthenticated, hearsay
document in support of Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss because it was not included with Reynolds'
pleadings.

See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) (noting that motion for judgment on pleadings is

converted to motion for summary judgment if matters outside pleadings is considered).

The

Court agrees. "The Club at Reynolds Plantation Rules and Regulations" were not attached to the
pleadings and were not incorporated into the pleadings by reference through the generic mention
of "the rules and regulations of the club as they may exist from time to time" in the Lease-Sale
Contract.
Further, the COUli declines to convert this motion into a motion for summary judgment
because "[ e]vidence offered on motion for summary judgment is held to the same standards of
admissibility as evidence at trial, and evidence inadmissible at trial is generally inadmissible on
motion for summary judgment" and the Rules and Regulations supplied as an exhibit to
4
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See Hagan v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 585, 586 (1997) (citing

Hall v. Cracker Barrel, etc., 223 Ga. App. 88,92 (1996)).
Accordingly, Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

W1Sday of June, 2014.

SO ORDERED thiS

ELIZAB:t::::~GE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:

At,t,orneYs for

Plalntiffs

Keith S. Hasson
Michael F. O'Neill
Hasson Law Group, P.C.
3379 Peachtree Rd, NE, Suite 625
Atlanta, GA 30326
678-701-2869

Attorneys for Defendants
B. Wan-en Pope
David M. Barnes
King & Spalding LLP
1180 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30309
404-572-4600
WQo12e@kslaw.com
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